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Abstract: The vast sums of money involved in megaprojects, and the perceived lack of public 
benefit, create controversy. Flyvberg’ s iron law asserts that megaprojects are over budget, over 
time, under benefits, over and over again (Flyvberg, 2018). More recent research suggests that 
this focus on cost overruns is based on highly misleading data (Love & Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2017). 
This research seeks to examine live megaprojects and examine Flyvbjergs theories in practice, 
through an investigation of current megaprojects in the Middle East. The research provides three 
case studies for two recently completed and one on-going megaproject, to examine these claims 
further. The research questions whether the right comparisons are made between the initial 
offerings and final product, through consultation with professionals. Based on the findings, it is 
suggested that an increase of over 100% of the Contract price, may not constitute an over-budget 
megaproject. Professional Cost Consultants in the built environment can provide greater insight 
into the complexity that adds cost in the transitions from initial to final costs for megaprojects, 
although the validity of this insight may be reduced by a lack of distance from or overview of 
the megaproject. This paper investigates some of the familiar sources of megaproject cost 
overrun and considers the findings of Cost Consultants engaged in monitoring megaprojects in 
the state of Qatar. Time and Cost considerations are just two of the characteristics evident in 
megaprojects. This research suggests that reporting of time and cost overruns is frequently based 
on limited, misunderstood or misreported data, and that in order to provide higher fidelity, such 
‘headline claims’ need to be careful considered in the context of the original project scope. This 
paper recognises that cost is just one element of a megaproject, and that megaprojects warrant 
more holistic considerations including acknowledgement of other significant characteristics 
such as their embodiment of large components of risk, political influences, organisational 
pressures and management complexities. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Headlines in the popular and trade press regularly draw attention to supposed extreme and 
regular time and cost overruns associated with megaprojects. Examples include the U.K. HS2 
high-speed railway (Transcity Rail, 2019), Mexico’s recently suspended new airport (Reuters, 
2018), Ethiopia's delayed new dam (Ref). Megaprojects such as Dubai’s International Airport, 
Hong Kong Airport or the Panama Canal contribute directly to a significant portion of the 
country’s GDP (Flyvberg, 2017; McKinsey, 2015; Merrow, 1988) and so are essential to the 
local and global economy. This paper suggests that to arrive at a more accurate assessment of 
the issues in megaprojects, there is a need to consider all the project complexities and 
recommends a departure from the prioritisation of cost and time issues. While much of the 
research to date is dominated by EU related megaprojects  (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002), 
this paper captures current Middle Eastern data. Large scale megaprojects are prominent in the 
Middle East, with the inclusion of projects such as the $500 billion NEOM megaproject in 
Saudi Arabia or the new $50 billion  Lusail City in Qatar (GCR, 2018; Lusail, 2019). Current 
research considers cost overrun as the increase from the initial costs of a megaproject to its 
final costs (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p. 293). The author suggests that this logic is fundamentally 
flawed, as the initial product and final product are often quite different. This research examined 
three case studies involving “over-budget” megaprojects in the GCC. It provided a % 
comparison between the contract sum and the additional outturn costs, noting that the 
megaproject final costs reflected increases of between 17% to 113% of the contract sum. The 
paper investigates the factors which influenced these budget increases, to put these changes 
into perspective.  
 
 
2 DEFINING MEGAPROJECTS & EXAMINING THEIR REPUTATION 
 
Megaprojects are typically described as large-scale, complex ventures costing a billion dollars 
or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private 
stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people (Davies, Dodgson, Gann, & 
Macaulay, 2017; Flyvberg, 2017; Mok, Shen, & Yang, 2015; Pollack, Biesenthal, Sankaran, 
& Clegg, 2018a; Turner, 2018). Megaprojects have been described as wild beasts ……., hard 
to tame, known for their complexity, vast size, expensive cost, and long time frame (Zidane, 
Johansen and Ekambaram, 2013 p349). They were once considered privileged particles of the 
development process Hirschman (1995: vii, xi), but recent research indicates that they are 
growing ever larger and their scale seems to be accelerating (Flyvberg, 2017, p. 5). 
Megaprojects are inevitably accompanied by a perception of a lack of benefit to attract public 
scrutiny. Criticisms have recently been levied against the U.K.’s HS2 high-speed railways 
(Transcity Rail, 2019), Mexico’s recently suspended new airport (Reuters, 2018) or Ethiopia’s 
delayed new dam (GCR, 2018). It has also been identified that the high financial cost of 
megaprojects such as Dubai’s International Airport, Hong Kong Airport or the Panama Canal 
contributes directly to a significant portion of the country’s GDP (Flyvberg, 2017; McKinsey, 
2015; Merrow, 1988). The vast sums of money involved in these ventures and the perceived 
lack of benefits to the public such as Mexico’s airport or Ethiopia’s Dam create controversy. 
There are also cases where megaprojects may be seen as financial failures, yet perceived by 
the public as a success, such as the UK- France Channel Tunnel or the Sydney Opera house 
(Flyvbjerg, 2018, Answer 99). 
 
 
2.1 Overbudget, over time, under benefits, over and over again 
 
In November 2018, the UK government expressed growing concern at the levels of financial 
exposure and the risks associated with UK megaprojects. To address these concerns, they 
requested  Professor Flyvberg, in November 2018, to address the Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee in the House of Commons and explain his Iron Law of 
Megaprojects (Flyvberg, 2018). In response, he suggested that megaprojects are over budget, 
over time, under benefits, over and over again (Question 89). He later clarified this statement 
to indicate that they were within budget once in every ten occasions (Answer 90). Research 
concerning cost overruns in megaprojects Underestimating Costs in Public Works Contracts: 
Errors or Lie?  (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) , is credited with a pendulum swing in directing 
criticisms of megaprojects away from technical explanations, to a focus on costs (Siemiatycki, 
2018a, p. 364). It was suggested that megaproject budgets were derived using a false 
assumption that Everything Goes According to Plan Flyvbjerg et al., (2002, p. 289).  
 
Flyvbjergs widely quoted assertions have been criticised for failing to consider the broader 
impacts such as social, economic and political spectrum (Room, 2018, p. 368). His work has 
also been criticised for strategic misrepresentation associated with analysis of projects (the 
inclusion of non-megaprojects valued at 1.5 million), a lack of scrutiny of the data used to 
produce the quantitative statements  and the lack of a universal standard or comparison for cost 
measurement ( Love & Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018, p. 5,11,15,19). He is accused of sensationalising 
financial data through ‘cherry-picking results’ (Love & Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018) and using  
provocative and memorable titles to publicise his theories (Siemiatycki, 2018b) 
 
Around the same timeframe of Errors or Lie?, a paper was published, which described 
megaprojects as an Autonomy of Ambition (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003). This 
paper highlights the risk of cost overruns, but critically also acknowledged other challenges 
associated with megaprojects, such as large-scale decision making, performance shortfalls, and 
environmental impacts. A recent longitudinal study of the expansion of Heathrow Airport’s T2 
terminal, the Olympic Village and Cross rail suggested that megaproject underperformances 
are not cost-related, but instead due to inadequate organisational structural development 
(Perspective, Lundrigan, & Gil, 2015). Additional research has reinforced the complexities of 
organising megaprojects, recommending that they should be considered as collaborative 
developments of one-off indivisible structures under pressure (Perspective et al., 2015, p. 32).  
 
This paper suggests that there is a significant danger that preoccupation with time and cost 
characteristics of megaprojects may distract from consideration of the other complexities 
associated with these extremely challenging ventures. Research has shown that other critical 
factors related to megaprojects such as public accountability, the complications in managing 
stakeholders, the volume of risk associated with their delivery, organisational and leadership 
challenges, the complexities of dealing with multi-cultural leadership or even the megaprojects 
impact on the nations GDP, can be as challenging as financial constraints (Li & Guo, 2011; 
Pollack et al., 2018a). The author suggests that a significant number of these issues, such as 
multi-cultural and leadership risks, do not receive sufficient consideration until it becomes too 
late to control their impacts. Researchers are now recommending the consideration of a more 
holistic approach towards the analysis of megaprojects characteristics, away from the 
traditional focus of time and cost characteristics  (Eweje, Turner and Müller, (2012); Mišić and 
Radujković,(2015); Pollack, (2018); Garemo, Matzinger and Palter, (2015)). Initially, 
megaprojects were classified in terms of their initial cost, before research explored the multiple 
complexities associated with their execution. Cost has a significant role in the successful 
delivery of megaprojects, but megaprojects must be considered as more than a number. 
 
2.2 Megaprojects as a Number 
 
The traditional linking of a megaproject as a project higher than one billion is linked to Capka 
(2004). He has been credited with establishing a megaproject benchmark value of one billion 
dollars for the new different breed of the project (megaproject) which was emerging in 
infrastructure projects for the United States Department of Transportation. Many countries 
have since followed suit, associating a monetary value of one billion units. These include Hong 
Kong one billion dollars (Mok et al., 2015); the UK one billion pounds (Flyvberg, 2017) and 
Europe considers projects of one billion euros (Pau, Langeland, & Njå, 2016). As costs are 
subject to inflationary pressures and continue to expand, researchers now consider augmented 
titles, such as the existence of Giga projects and Tera projects [Flyvbjerg & others] (2014). 
Researchers also refer to a new variety of enhanced or complex megaprojects Hillson (2018). 
It is evident that  one billion of a local currency may have a significant impact on that countries 
GDP ( Gross Domestic Product, yet the scale of some recent GCC projects, such as Saudi 
Arabia’s $500 billion Neom city (GSR news, 2017) or Qatar’s  $46 billion Lusail City project 
(www.lusail.com) make one billion pounds appear an inappropriate measure. While critics 
may refer to budget overruns and time overruns  (Flyvberg, 2017, 2018; Flyvbjerg, 2014b), it 
is worth noting that a megaproject’s scope often grows and expands throughout its lifespan. It 
is misleading to relate initial costs to final costs when significant changes may be occurring 
during the megaproject’s evolution. This paper suggests that when one compares the starting 
and final product, then labelling this increase as overbudget costs may not be accurate as we 
are comparing different scopes of works, the proverbial apples versus oranges scenario. A case 
study of three GCC megaprojects is used to examine the impact of changes on megaproject 
budgets. 
 
 
3 THE SEARCH FOR A MORE HOLISTIC DEFINITION OF MEGAPROJECTS  
 
Despite the often unique and temporary nature of megaprojects, research has shown that they 
often exhibit core characteristics. These may include short-term temporary collaborations for 
bespoke developments (Van Marrewijk, Veenswijk, & Clegg, 2014). Core megaproject 
characteristics need to be isolated to permit a more thorough examination of their nuances and 
interdependencies. After thematic analysis, repeated themes such as their complexity, size, and 
scale become evident. The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management Flyvbjerg, (2017b) 
collated views of  43 active megaproject researchers, seeking to understand the complexities 
of such ventures. The identification of common characteristics is difficult due to the unique 
nature of many of these projects and the knowledge that they are often considered as temporary 
endeavours (Brookes, Sage, Dainty, Locatelli, & Whyte, 2017). They also exhibit temporal 
characteristics such as task complexity, singularity and innovativeness (Sydow, 2017). Recent 
research (van Marrewijk, Ybema, Smits, Clegg, & Pitsis, 2016, p. 1750) emphasises the culture 
of temporariness within megaprojects makes collaboration critical, difficult and laborious, 
frequently resulting in underperformance or failure of the megaproject. This analysis also 
enables a review of how factors such as organisational, national or professional culture may 
influence megaproject governance. Such analysis helps outline the high levels of risks 
associated with megaprojects. The phenomenon of managing megaprojects is the subject of a 
European study seeking to understand how megaprojects can be designed and delivered more 
effectively to ensure their effective commissioning within the European Union  (Barbero & 
Redi, 2015). Further analysis of megaprojects identifies other factors such as cultural 
influences impacting their governance, their association with vast levels of risk and their 
reputation of being notoriously hard to manage, permitting a fuller understanding.  Works by 
Eweje, Turner and Müller, (2012); Mišić and Radujković,(2015) researched and exposed many 
of the complex characteristics associated with megaprojects. Researchers, including Pollack, 
(2018); Garemo, Matzinger and Palter, (2015) and Flyvberg (2017), have highlighted critical 
characteristics which caused completed megaprojects to succeed or fail.  
 
A thematic analysis of these characteristics includes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Megaprojects 
Characteristics 
4. Risk 
1. Political Influence 
2.Leadership/governance 
3. Scale and Duration 
1 A Government Influences (Politics) 
1 B Community Management (Stakeholders)  
 2A Project Governance  
2B Core Team Management / Team 
Culture  
                2C Multicultural Leadership 
3A Contract Size  
3B Time (Lengthy)  
        3C Adaptability / Scope Change 
3D Uniqueness  
             3E High Cost / Cost Overrun 
4B Legal Challenges  
 4C Controversial / Black swan 
4A Risk / Uncertainty  
3.1 Time & Cost Considerations 
 
Based on the isolation of a megaproject’s characteristics, it is evident that Time and Cost 
considerations are critical elements in the evaluation of megaprojects. A recent analysis of 
risks in megaprojects considered published findings, specifically related to risk management 
in megaprojects. This research found that time and costs risks were the most frequent 
megaproject risk, as evidenced by their dominance in over forty per cent of published literature 
reviewed (Irimia-Diéguez, Sanchez-Cazorla, & Alfalla-Luque, 2014). Flyberg remains a 
staunch critic of megaproject time and cost overruns and has suggested a systematic 
falsification of initial costs. He suggests that this represents a Hiding Hand principle(Flyvbjerg, 
2014a). This principle suggests that these cost estimates are systematically, and significantly 
deceptive, and indicated that such distortions are directly related to politics, economic self-
interest and the buildings of a monument as a legacy (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p. 290).  
 
In Europe, the majority of megaprojects are either State-funded or shareholder funded. Both 
funders provide a degree of transparency for financial costs associated with the megaproject 
outturn costs. Not all data is available as there are significant difficulties in gathering cost data 
related to megaprojects. The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors through its members, 
provide construction costings on a global basis. They advise the complexities involved in 
assessing megaproject costs including a decline in the use of Bills of Quantities ( the traditional 
method of pricing projects), proprietary designs and uniqueness and confidentiality as critical 
sources why accurate cost comparisons cannot be made on a global basis (Horner & Muse, 
2018). Provision of reliable financial data is crucial to the analysis of budget costs, as it allows 
researchers to establish valid comparisons between the original and final expenses of 
megaprojects. To date, there is a lack of published cost data for megaprojects associated with 
the GCC. Due to such lack of data, existing research has concentrated principally on large 
European projects, (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p. 294). Some general studies are available 
(Johnson & Babu, 2018a; Mahdi & Soliman, 2018), which qualitatively engaged with GCC 
practitioners and examined the reasons for cost and time overruns in GCC megaprojects. 
However, they appear to lack of credible substantiation. Despite challenges associated with 
obtaining megaproject financial data in the GCC, three case studies were undertaken with 
international Cost Consultants. They provided financial data for some critical GCC 
megaprojects. The Cost Consultants have disguised confidentially confidential data but 
retained the ratio of the percentage cost adjustments for the components which impacted the 
contract sum. Despite this concealment of commercially sensitive data, the causes and 
proportions of changes represent the actual changes during the lifespan of the megaproject and 
serve as a benchmark for cost increments (overbudget in Flyvberg’ s view) of the megaproject.  
 
3.2 Middle East Megaprojects 
 
Prior to considering this case study, it is  beneficial to review the contextual background of 
GCC megaprojects , to appreciate how typical GCC megaprojects may differ from those 
European megaprojects examined by other researchers, such as (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Pollack 
et al., 2018b; van Marrewijk, Smits, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008). The Middle East and 
in particular the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) states extensively use megaprojects to 
deliver new cities, infrastructure and oil and gas-related projects. Deloitte (2016) estimated 
that the GCC has a US$2 trillion pipeline of projects under construction or planned. In June 
2018, there were  300 active megaprojects, either being tendered or under construction in the 
GCC (www.constructionweekonline.com/projects). GCC megaprojects engage large numbers 
of non-European expatriate workers to support the creation of their megaprojects with 
Individual GCC States’ reliance on expatriates, ranges from thirty-two per cent in Saudi Arabia 
to eighty per cent in Qatar in 2018. There are further challenges due to the mix of workforce 
culture, the complexities of design, and unique challenges due to the existence of multiple 
cultures involved in managing the process (Johnson & Babu, 2018b). Statistics indicate that 
the GCC engages almost nine million personnel in its construction sector, nearly twice the 4.8 
million staff employed throughout the European Union, (Statista, 2019). In monetary terms, 
the value of construction-related activities accounts for nineteen per cent of GDP in the GCC 
which represents twice the estimated nine per cent construction spend in Europe (European 
Building Confederation, (2019). Table 1 summarises critical considerations for GC 
megaprojects by combining data related to GDP (World bank data, 2019) and population data 
(data.worldbank.org). It applies Central Intelligence Agency data, which estimates the 
percentages of expatriate and considers construction AECOM, (2018).  
 
Table 1 – GCC Statistics  (AECOM, 2018; Central Intelligence Agency, 2019; World bank data, 2019) 
Expatriate Statistics Qatar www.mdps.gov.qa; Oman www.ncsi.gov.om; Bahrain www.blmi.lmra.bh; UAE 
www.grc.net; Saudi Arabia ; Kuwait www.ceicdata.com/en/kuwait 
 
  
GCC State  Total 
Population 
Expatriate 
Population 
Expatriates 
Residents 
% Expats in 
Construction 
GDP  
USD Billion 
Value of 
Construction 
USD, Billion  
1 Qatar 2,639,211  2,111,369 80 %         50% 167.605 46.4 
2 KSA 32,938,213  10,500,000 32 %        36% 683.827 109 
3 UAE 9,400,145  7,800,000 83 %         30% 382.575 87.7 
4 Kuwait 4,136,528  2,895,570 70 %         17% 120.126 12.6 
5 Oman 4,636,262  2,086,318 45 %         31% 72.643 15.2 
6 Bahrain 1,492,584  666,000 45 %        22% 35.307 7.7 
7 Totals 55,242,943  26,059,256 47 %        31% 1,462,083 279 
 
As indicated in column six, construction personnel account for between seventeen and fifty 
per cent of all expatriates within a particular state. Construction-related activities currently 
account for nineteen per cent of the GCC’s Gross Domestic Product (World Bank, 2019). The 
nine million expatriate construction staff  employed on GCC mega-projects, make the 
workforce for these projects multicultural (Dulaimi & Hariz, 2011), with the management  
often comprising an extensive gathering of culturally diverse hired in expert consultants 
(Archibald et al.,1991) assembled from a pool of highly qualified resources around the world  
(El-sabek, 2017).  
 
 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH 
 
Case studies are considered a suitable method to examine complex projects within the built 
environment, such as megaprojects. Case Studies permit the investigator to retain the holistic 
and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, together with providing an ability to capture 
rich and complex data Barrett & Sutrisna, (2009). The author was working in the Middle East 
state of Qatar at the time of the research and had access to several firms of Cost Consultants in 
Qatar. There were eight live megaprojects at the time of the study (Summer 2019), and the 
Cost Consultants involved in these megaprojects were requested to participate in this research. 
Six western consultants were involved in the eight live megaprojects. Three agreed to join 
within the stipulated time frame (three months), while others refused citing time constraints, 
workload or confidentiality reasons for their non-participation. Two of the three cost 
consultants feature in the top ten cost consultancy practices (Building Magazine, 2019), and 
the third practice is based in Lebanon, which has multiple offices in the Middle East. 
4.1 Quantitative or Qualitative approaches 
 
There is a debate between the quantitative approach taken by Flyvberg in his review of 258 
Infrastructure projects sample (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p. 293) and the earlier qualitative 
research by Hirschman (Lepenies, 2018, p. 361). Flyvberg suggested that Hirschman 
overstated his concepts based on a limited number of observations and biased data, while  
Lepine's contends that Hirschman's data provided half a century ago remains sound in principle 
(Lepenies, 2018, p. 262,264). One of Hirschman's suggestions is that some megaprojects 
succeeded by creatively responding to their context and succeeded through a form of luck or 
chance. Flyvberg suggests the this reflects a hiding hand principle as a fallacy of beneficial 
ignorance (Flyvbjerg, 2016) In his paper he argues that construction Estimators provide 
unrealistically optimistic outlooks - overestimating benefits and potential success, yet 
substantially underestimate costs. A review of 161 World Bank-funded projects found 
evidence of the presence of influences including problem-solving, opportunity costs and luck 
(Ika, 2018).  
 
Quantitative data may be taken from the figures provided by public accounts or shareholders 
year-end financial numbers may indeed offer an opening and closing balance for costs 
associated with a Megaproject. It is the authors view that expert construction knowledge and 
qualitative interpretation is required to understand why prices have increased and if they are 
the result of initial deceptive underestimations or the result of changing requirements. This 
research seeks to capture the experience of directors within such expert western Cost 
Consultancies. There was also a time constraint associated with a quantitative or qualitative 
choice in methodology. Flyvbjergs data was assembled over desk research for four years  
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p. 293), while the contributors to this research typically have between 
15 and 20 years of field exposure and were able to make use of this extensive practical 
experience. As the subject of interest, requires extensive feedback from the practising 
participants, semi-structured interviews were arranged around core themes and included the 
opportunity for the respondent to provide unstructured observation and analysis of the subject 
problem. Interviews were conducted on face to face basis. The initial meeting recorded the 
original scope and financial details of the project, confirming opening and closing account 
balances. These are detailed in Appendix 1. A series of follow-up interviews took place (three 
per case study) during which significant changes, both positive and negative, were analysed. 
This information provided the delta between the original and final price cost overrun 
(Flyvberg’ s overbudget). This data was analysed and presented in annual increments, spanning 
the megaprojects lifespan except for one on-going megaproject. Once significant variations 
were identified, the reasons for these changes were explored. Following the completion of this 
review and the interpretation of the data, the data was summarised, tabulated and returned to 
the provider to review its authenticity. To retain confidentiality, the parties adjusted the figures 
(keeping accurate to the ratio of the variations) and endorsed its use in this case study. 
 
 
5 INTERROGATION OF THREE GCC CASE STUDIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 
IMPACT OF CHANGES 
 
Experienced construction professional consultants expect changes. In international contracts, 
provisions are made to anticipate and govern changes to the original scope. An extensively 
used form of contract -  FIDIC – an acronym for the International Federation of Consulting 
Engineer - controls such changes using specific conditions of the agreement,  Clauses 8 and 13 
(FIDIC, 1999). These changes have time, and cost implications and the Contract Price gets 
adjusted accordingly in a process labelled as variations. The initially agreed price is known as 
the contract sum. At the end of the project, a final account is prepared based on the original 
contract price and the adjustment of all variations issued on the project. This concludes the 
contract and provides a final sum for the megaproject (Clause 14). The methodology used by 
researchers, including Flyvberg is to measure the difference between actual and estimated costs 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, p. 293). This equates to comparing the original contract sum with the 
agreed final account. A diverse set of megaprojects was selected for this research including an 
Airport, a Financial Hub and a new City. GCC megaprojects are generally large projects with 
a construction duration of up to ten years, such as the examples in the case studies considered 
within this research. While it may seem appropriate for Airports to engage the most advanced 
technology available, such as advancements in specialist radar systems, these technological 
advancements often come at a cost. Similarly, in the case of the new city, may seek to cater for 
updated infrastructure systems, such as a free-flow traffic movement and smart city 
requirements. These updates also attract a cost. The city’s retail and recreational needs were 
also updated to incorporate demographics trends. The size of its commercial units, square 
footage of its tenant and public transport availability influenced variations to the original 
concept of the City. The Financial District responded to the revised office needs of relocating 
companies. Current research models fail to consider these natural progressions and may be 
classified as overbudget. The necessity to make changes and this impact on the financial 
outcome of three megaprojects are explored in the following Case Studies. 
 
 
5.1 Case Study A – Financial District  - Project Details 
 
A new Financial District was developed for West Bay containing 700,000 m² of built-up area. 
The development comprises of 9 high-rise office towers, each up to 52 storeys in height, a five-
star hotel, 15 podiums, state-of-the-art elevated car parking for 5,000 cars, primary substations 
and an energy centre. The Financial District is was designed to serve the global, regional and 
local financial sector. The project commenced in 2008 and construction was completed in early 
2016. This was significantly later than its planned duration of five years, and the budget 
increased by seventeen per cent. The financial details are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Changes during the construction of the megaproject 
 
Initially, the project suffered delays as the Employer restructured his organisation. This 
revision changed the planned occupation and fit-out for one full 52 storey tower. For the first 
five years of the project, 2008 – 2012, the project budget was reduced. On investigation, the 
Cost Consultant explained these reductions were the result of both value engineering and the 
omission of previously planned works. One definition of value engineering describes it as a 
process wherein the designers are requested to retain the same function at a lower price (Janani, 
2019). The changes included a lowering in the thermal rating for glazing to the tower façade 
and accounted for a 2% reduction in the overall project costs, which represented a saving of 
around £120 million. Other minor cost variations occurred, and a significant budget increase 
was encountered in 2014 – 2015. As the overall size of the development appeared unchanged, 
the Cost Consultant was asked to explain the increment. His responded that a new tenant had 
purchased the development in its entirety. The rapidly declining price of commodities during 
2014 and 2015, resulted in the client reducing his spending budget and deferring works to suit 
his adjusted cash-flow, in addition to reconsidering his office requirements, directing his 
advisers to alter parking and office space requirements. This resulted in a reduction in open 
areas, revised sizing of offices, increased car parking provisions and associated mechanical 
and electrical re-work. These were the significant changes with further details provided in 
Appendices 1. Overall the Cost Consultant confirmed that the project might have resulted in 
saving due to the optimisation of finishes, had the change of use not been applied. The 17% 
cost overrun, and the three-year delay period was accepted as attributable to changes in scope. 
Significantly the Cost Consultants viewed the project as a financial success. 
 
5.2 Case Study B – Airport Extension - Project Details  
 
The project involved the extension to an International Airport including departure and arrival 
lounges, with a built-up area of 134,000m2 including the full fit-out of lounges and food and 
beverage facilities. The construction contract was awarded in two phases. Phase 1included the 
main body of the Airport, and Phase 2 the nodes or extensions to the main body. This Phase 2 
megaproject was awarded in 2009, and the building shell was structurally complete in 2014. 
The internal fit-outs and lobbies were undertaking a fit-out which was finished by late 2016. 
 
Changes during the construction of the megaproject 
 
The costs associated with this project increased by 113% of the original contract sum. The Cost 
Consultants figures were analysed as detailed in Appendix 1. Following analysis of these 
figures, it became apparent that substantial additional works were incorporated to cater for an 
addition fit-out for lounges in the airport. These extra works were awarded in 2012 and 2014 
for business class lounges, economy lounges, and a large number of restaurants and retail fit-
outs. As these works did not form part of the original scope of works, they are categorised as 
variations. By removing these additional works from the contract scope, the suggested overrun 
reduced further from 113% to 55%. Further investigations examined a significant budget rise 
between 2015 and 2016. These investigations revealed that the massive spike in costs was 
associated with the award of the fit-out for a 5-star transit hotel. This luxurious hotel, 
incorporating a spa and fit-out accounted for over 25% of the initial budget increase. Following 
reduction of the additional lounges fit-out (58% of the overrun) and the hotel fit-out costs (25% 
of the overrun) the project costs had increased by 17 %. Cost Consultants then categorised 
these figures into different elements. Some 8% were allocated to Airport security and 
technological enhancements and the balance 9% had various uses, e.g. a specific aesthetic 
enhancement. The Contractors had also submitted claims for additional costs and management 
fees throughout the additional works. These were dealt with as overheads associated with the 
fit-out packages and the final accounts closed. Overall the Cost Consultant confirmed that the 
project was considered financially justifiable and that value for money was achieved. Despite 
the headline budget increase of 113% and three-year delays, this project is not viewed as 
overbudget. 
 
5.3 Case Study C – New City - Project Details 
 
This New City comprises of thirty-five square kilometres of land and water. The total land area 
is approximately twenty square kilometres. The City provides residential housing for about 
195,000 residents, with mixed-use of retail, commercial, hotels, community facilities and 
recreational areas. It has an anticipated work and residential population of 450,000. The project 
commenced in 2012 and is continuing with an expected completion of 2021. This is 
significantly longer than its planned duration of five years, and the budget has increased by 
twenty-four per cent to date. 
 
Changes during the construction of the megaproject 
 
This twenty-four per cent cost increase would equate to £1.5 billion. The city was developed 
through various masterplans which emerged as the city evolved. There was a total of 17 
masterplans reflected a significant progression with changes in land use within the city. 
Additional infrastructure works were done including other bridges to cater for newly created 
islands. The mix of retail and residential evolved as investors purchased plots, and the city met 
updated standards from the Statutory Authorities governing road and utility standards 
throughout the state. These included changes to the Traffic Control systems, a nationwide 
initiative to make key roads intersecting the Country as Freeflow (no traffic lights). The road 
authorities removed roundabouts from current construction projects and generally upgraded the 
specifications for road surfacing and lighting. The revised mix of tenants also gave rise to a 
significant change in the utility distribution network and associated facilities (substations and 
transformer capacities). 
 
 
Based on a reduced income from commodities from 2014 to 2016, there was a Statewide 
initiative to reduce the costs of infrastructure projects, including the postponement or 
cancellation of services considered as non-essential. This resulted in reductions to the number 
of staff engaged in the management of the construction process and the reduction in rates and 
salaries to all parties. Deferment of non-essential landscaping, removal of provisions for 
Artwork and ornate lighting proposals were considered to reduce the budget. The project is still 
progressing using reduced rates for consultants. The scale and scope of works have increased 
to cater for timely completion of the works before the 2022 World Cup as the intended venue 
for the closing ceremony. Overall the Cost Consultant believes that value for money was 
achieved. The cost budgets have been increased, and despite the forecast, six-year overrun, the 
revised and improve city shall be seen as a financial success. 
 
5.4 Overall Findings 
 
Individually each of the three megaprojects experienced multiple changes through their 
evaluation. At first view, these megaprojects were over budget by 17 %, 113% and 24% 
equating to a cost increase of almost two billion pounds. They were each impacted by a global 
downturn in oil prices and incurred substantial variations and time delays throughout their 
lifespan. Despite each megaproject being over budget, each of the Cost Consultants considered 
the project as a financial success. This is based on their experiences with construction costs 
and the knowledge that variations cost money. They do not find that the megaproject was 
overbudget, as they have appropriately adjusted the initial budget progressively to match the 
Employers updated requirements. 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD  
 
This research recommends that cost overruns in megaprojects should be evaluated by capturing 
the detailed contextual knowledge of the project construction cost consultant and avoid the 
simplistic approach of deducting the initial and final costs and labelling all differences as 
‘overbudget’. While time and cost risk makes up a reported 40 plus per cent of documented 
risk and is prey to sensational headlines, this author recommends that megaprojects should be 
considered at a more holistic level. When gauging the success or failure of megaprojects, it is 
essential to examine all complexities and characteristics associated with megaprojects, such as 
the consideration of risk and culture (Garemo et al., 2015; Pollack et al., 2018a; Söderlund et 
al., 2017). It is well known to professional construction consultants that the cost increases in 
such megaprojects are often explained by changes to the project scope. It urges caution in the 
use of distorted figures and allegations of financial mismanagement, without a fuller 
examination of the facts. Three megaproject case studies in the Middle East were carried out, 
and all found evidence from the cost consultants that increases of up to two billion pounds 
were explained and justified and the project cannot, therefore, be accurately described as ‘over 
budget’.  
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